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In the 11 Pacificus-Helvidius 11 debate of 1793, Alexander Hamilton
locked horns with James Madison in a classic excha.nge of broadsides on
the.tssue of.express versus inherent executive powers.

In his inter-

pretation of presidential powers, Hamilton sows the seeds for an argument which justifies the exercise of executive powers in combating
situations of .domestic emergency and in matters concerning the general
welfare or public interest. The seeds of this theory took firm root
more than sixty years later in the administration of Abraham Lincoln.
Subsequently, the growth of these roots was stimulated by the Supreme
Court's decisions in the famous cases of rn·re Neagle

(1890)~

In re

Debs (1895), and United States v. Midwest Oil Co. (1915) and has
b1ossomed into a fullblown, if not overblown, succession of 11 strong 11
Presidents during the last seventy years. Along with the spiraling

I.

development of executive power, volumes of critical material gushed

I

forth in response to both the growth of presidential powers and its

I:
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11

11

I.

budding "textbook Presidency" rationa1e; 1 however, the impact of this

I

I

response has been slight, and as one author of the late 1950's put it,
"the President of today is a creature of custom. 2
11

Given the above introduction, the purpose of this paper is to
discuss the role of the Supreme Court in an expanding Presidency by
focusing on its decisions in Youngstown

Sheet·and:Tube·Co~

v. Saw.Yer

(1952), New York Times Co. v. United States (197l), and.United States
v. Nixon {1974).

It is believed that the various opinions found in the

three cases mirror the ever-increasing debate which surrounds the. growth
of executive powers.

As rulings, the decisions not only provide the

Supreme Court's views on the scope of inherent executive powers, but also
provide a means with,'which to analyze the role of the Court in the expanding Presidency.

Since each of the decisions turned on the special

circumstances of the particular case, it is s.uggested that none of the
rulings can be read as imposing any serious limitations on inherent
executive powers.

On the contrary, the burden and thesis of this paper

is that the Court, in each of the three cases, paved the way for future
presidential claims of implied powers.

lThe term is borrowed from Thomas E. Cronin, "The Textbook Presi.;.
dency and Political Science," a paper presented at the 66th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in 1970. As Cronin
sees it, the "textbook Presidency" rationale is the notion that the
President is the chief architect of public policy and that only he, by
interpreting his powers expansively, can engineer progressive cha.nge.
Two classic texts which follow this framework are Richard Neustadt's
Presidential Power {New York: New American Library, 1960); and Clinton
Rossiter's The American Presidenc¥ (New York: Harcourt and Brace, 1956).
For the recent responses challenging this rationale, see Theodore Lowi,
The End of Liberalism (New York: Norton, 1969); Daniel P. Moynihan,
Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding· (New York: Macmillan, 1969); and Peter
Drucker, The Age of Discontinuity (New York: Harper and Row, 1969).
2Robert G. McC....:roskey (ed.), "The Powers of th President," in ESsays
in Constitutional Law (New York: Knopf, 1957), p. 253.
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An analysis of the three cases necessarily entails an examination
of the events and writings that give the concept of inherent executive
powers its initial focus. 3 In the 11 Pacificus-Helvidius 11 exchange, the
argument invoked by Hamilton was

.a

defense of President Washington's

action in issuing a proclamation of neutrality upon the outbreak of war
between England and France. Washington's action triggered charges by
his political opponents, the Republicans, that the proclamation was
without

constitutional~.or

statutory authority.

Hamilton, writing under

the pseudonym 11 Pacificus, 11 responded to these charges by making a distinction between the legislative and executive grants of power found in
the Constitution. The opening clause of Article I begins on one hand
I

with the words "all legislative powers herein granted" and proceeds with

•

an enumeration of these powers. On the other hand, the initial sentence
of Article II states that 11 the executive Power shall be vested in a
President of the United States of America." After enumerating the specified constitutional powers of the President--such as the power to grant
pardons, to receive ambassadors and to make appointments, Hamilton conI'

I
I

!

I
I

tends that it would be unreasonable to assume that the executive powers
were confined to these authorizations alone and concludes his argument
by saying:
The enumeration ought therefore to be considered as intended to
specify merely the principle articles implied in the definition
of executive power, interpreted in conformity with the other parts
of the Constitution and with the principles of free government.
The general doctrine of our constitution then is that the executive
power of the nation is vested in the President, subject only to

I

I

«

I

'"

I

3Arbitrarily, I begin the development of "executive powers" with
the argument invoked by Hamilton in the 11 Pacificus-Helvidius 11 exchange.
The concept of executive powers, however, ean easily be traced to 1690,
when Locke posited that "the law-making power is not always in being
and usually too numerous, and so too slow for the dispatch requisite to
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the exceptions and qualifications which are expressed in the
instrument.4
It was Hamilton's view, then, that the President possesses both
inherent and express powers which are subject only to those qualifications found in the Constitution.

Differentiating between these two

types of power, he cites the removal power5 and the power to recognize
new governments as examples of inherent executive powers. According
to Hamilton, the President's inherent power to judge the obligations
of our treaties with foreign nations justified Washington's proclamation
of neutrality.
Writing as 11 Helvidius, 11 Madison rejected Hamilton's theory on the
grounds that the notion of inherent powers was not based on American
practices but borrowed from the royal prerogatives of British government.6 The underpinnings of Madison's challenge were soon swept aside
in both theory and practice.

By 1840 Abel Upshur could observe that

execution.
therefore there is a latitude left to the executive
power to do many things of choice which the laws do not prescribe;" Of
Civil Government (Book II, chap. xiv).
~
4Alexander Hamilton, The Works of Alexander Hamilton, Henry Cabot
Lodge (ed.), Vol. IV (New York: Putnam, 1904), p. 144.
5Hamilton's citation of the removal power is probably derived from
what has come to be known as the "decision of 1789. In the very first
Congress to assemble under the Constitution, the initial senten~e· of
Article II was invoked interestingly enough by Madison and other congressmen: to support the contention that the President had the power to remove
officers whose appointments were made with the advice and consent of the
Senate. C. Herman Pritchett suggests that a majority in Congress felt the
same way: The language actually put into the statute ••• reflected the
majority conclusion that the President already had the right of removal
on the basis of his 'executive power' under the Constitution;" The American Constitution (2nd ed.; New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), p. 334.
11

11

6Louis Fisher, President and ConTress: Power and Policy (New York:
Free Press, 1972), p. 33. For the fu 1 text of Madison's argument, see
The Writings of James MadiSon, Gaillard Hunt (ed.) VI (New York: Putnam,
1900-1910), pp. 138-88.
.
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it had been "gravely asserted in Congress that whatever power is niether
legislative nor judiciary, is of course, executive, and, as such, belongs
to the President under the Constitution.

117

The high-water mark, if not the widest interpretation of executive
powers, is found in the practices and policies of Presiqent Lincoln. As
John P. Roche points out, 11 the administration of Abraham Lincoln provides
••• the first full display of non-constitutional, non-statutory author-

1tY. applied to a domestic emergency. 118 .consequently, Lincoln's exercise
of executive prerogative in situations of 11 domestic

em~rgency 11

expanded

the interpretation of "executive powers" by providing the concept with
a new focus in rationale.
It was Lincoln's belief, that as the protector and defender of the

Constitution, he had the responsibility to use any and all means to preserve the Union. When Confederate sympathizers interrupted rail and
telegraph communications between Washington, D. C.

:~nd

Annapoli$, Mary-

land, Lincoln on April 27, 1861, seized the rail and telegraph installations. A week later, he ordered the regular army increased by 27,414
officers and men and the navy by 18,000. Such an obvious disregard of
the expressed constitutional delegation of pow.er to C!>ngress 11 to raise
and support armies, 11 evoked one loyal Republican senator to comment,i:'~J·
have never met anyone who claimed that the·President could, PY proclamation, increase the army or navy. 119

·I
'I

7cited by John P. Roche, 11 Executiye Power and Domestic Emergency:
1he Quest for Prerogative, 11 ·western Political Quarterly,·V (December,
1952)' p. 598.

8rnid., p. 598.
9

W. E. Binkley, The Powers of the President· (Garden City, New York:

1937)' p. 116.

.,'
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Although Lincoln did request a grant of retroactive authority
from Congress for his actions, his request for authority was not made
until he called Congress into

speci~l

session on JJly 4th--more than

two months after seizing the rail and telegraph installations.

In his

message to Congress, Lincoln justified his actions by saying, "These
measures, whether strictly legal or not, were ventured upon what appeared to be a popular demand and a public necessity ••• nothing has
been done beyond the constitutional competence of Congress. 1110 On
August 6, Congress accepted the request for retroactive authority by

I

providing in statute that 11 all the acts, proclamations, and orders of

·I

the President respecting the army and navy of the United States •••

I

are hereby approved and in all respects made.valid, 11 but there was also
the qualifier, "as if they had been issued and done under the previous
express authority and direction of Congress. 1111 Although the catch

•I

"

'

here suggests that the President had, in effect, been working for Congress
all along, Lincoln's frequent exercise of executive powers throughout the
Civil War simply undermined the assertion that there was a "previous
express authority." ·Invoking his executive powers without the advice
or approval of Congress, Lincoln turned government money over to
private individuals, suspended the writ of habeas corpus, and authorized
the military trial of civilians. The President's order to establish
military commissions for the trial of civilians drew bitter criticism
from various quarters and the question of its legality reached the
Supreme Court in 1864 and again in 1866.
In a proclamation of September 24, 1862, Lincoln coupled the sus-

lOsinkley, p. 117.
11rbid.,.p. 117.

-7pension of habeas corpus with an order that authorized military commanders to seize and try by military commissions civilians who engaged
in disloyal practices,
11

I.
I·

military operation.

11

even in areas outside the actual fields of

Although Congress ratified the habeas corpus sus-

pension in a subsequent act (1863), it never provided statutory authority for the trial of civilians by military tribunals. While the war was
still in progress, an attempt was made by Clement Vallandigham, a notorious agitator, to bring the validity of his arrest, trial and conviction
by military authorities before the Supreme Court. The Court in Ex parte
Vallandigham (1864) held that it was without jurisdiction and dismissed
the case.
With the war over and Lincoln dead, the Court challenged the President1s executive powers by entertaining a similar problem in Ex parte
Milligan, (1866).

Lambdin Milligan, a citizen of Indiana, was arrested

at his home in 1864, was. found guilty of disloyal activities by a military corrunission in October of the same year, and was sentenced to be
hanged on May 19, 1865.

Nine days

befo~e the~hanging,

Milligan sued

out a writ of habeas corpus to a federal circuit court in Indianapolis,
claiming that his constitutional rights had been violated.
The Supreme Court unanimously ruled that the President had exceeded
his constitutional and statutory authority by creating military commissions for the trial of civilians in areas where the civil courts were
open and operating.

The Court's ruling was weakened by the fact that

a majority of five went further and held that Congress didn't have the
authority to limit the constitutional rights of individuals either.
Since Congress had not authorized the trial of civilians by military
commissions, the issue was not properly before the Court. The majority
opinion, delivered by Justice Davis, is more remarkable because it as'

_J
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serts in effect that the Supreme Court is the final ju.dge of what constitutes a military "necessity."
Given the fact that the war was over, the Court's post mortem
challenge to the President's executive powers can be viewed as an
expected reaction.

No President had ever invaded cons ti tutiona 1 r.i ghts

more flagrantly than Lincoln, but were not his motives most worthy?
"Was it possible to lose the nation and yet preserve the Constitution? 11 12
It becomes increasingly clear that what is perceived to be the limits of
executive

po~ers

is largely determined by the situation at hand. More-

over, that rationale which dictates executive "prerogative" in cases of
military necessity also serves as a springboard for the exercise of
executive powers in "pressing" matters concerning the general welfare

'

.

or public interest.
:.

In the case of·In·re·NeaQle (1890), the

Suprem~~-Court

strengthened

I

I ,

the notion of presidential prerogative by applying a broad and authoritative interpretation to the executive power provision found in Article
II, Section 3: the President "shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed. 11 The Neagle case, to say the least, arose out of a very
·strange set of circumstances. Supreme Court Justice Field, whose
judicial

d~ties

entailed the circuit court in California, had had his

life threatened by a disappointed litigant, David S. Terry. The United
States Attorney General assigned Deputy Marshal Neagle as a bodyguard
when Field's circuit duties again carried him to California. Terry,
following up on his threat, approached Field in a railroad restaurant
and was about to draw a knife when Marshal Neagle shot and killed him.

1 2 Lincoln~ "Letter to .A. G. Hodges" (April 4, 1864), cited in
Binkley, p. 134·.
'
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Neagle was released upon a writ of habeas corpus that was issued from a
federal circuit court under a provision of the federal statutes which
made the writ available to one "in custody for an act done or omitted in
pursuance of a law of the United States. 11
The "law of the United States" upon which Neagle acted was not an
act of Congress, but an order issued by the Attorney General under the
authority of the President. Speaking for the Court, Justice Miller began his opinion by asking the question of whether the "duty" of the
President was "limited to the enforcement of Acts of Congress or of
treaties of the United States according to their express terms, 11 or
whether it 11 include(s) the rights, duties, and obligations growing out
of the Constitution itself,

o~r

international relations, and all the

protection implied by the nature of the government under the Constitution."

In sustaining Neagle's release, the Court held that the 11 laws 11

found in the "faithful execution of the laws" clause were not confined
by the acts of Congress, but included "any obligation fairly and properly
inferable" from the Constitution or "any duty" which can "be derived
from the general scope of ••• duties under the laws of the United
States. 11 For Miller and the Court, there was "a peace of the United
States" and the President was the keeper of that peace.
Five years later, the Court took the same position in the case of
In re Debs.

When violence broke out during the American Railway Union's

strike against railroads using Pullman cars, President Cleveland sent
federal troops to quell the disturbance, which had obstructed interstate
commerce and the mails, and ordered the Attorney General to obtain an
injunction against the strikers. The validity of the injunction was
appealed to the Supreme Court, since there was no specific statutory

-10basis for the injunction. The Court sustained the injunction on the
grounds that it was sought by the President to protect matters which
were •tentrusted by the Constitution 11 to the care of the nation. The
Court went on to hold that it is the obligation of the Executive 11 to
promote the interest of all, and to prevent .•• wrongdoing •••
resulting in injury tg the general welfare. 11
In his Autobiography (1913), Theodore Roosevelt expands on the
theme of the Neagle and Debs cases by positing that the President was
the 11 steward 11 of the people.

His conception of the Presidency was that

.•• every executive officer, and above all every executive
officer in high position, was a steward of the p~ople bound
actively and affirmatively to do all he could for the people
••• I declined to adopt the view that what was imperatively
necessary for the Nation could not be done by the President
unless he could find some specific authorization to do it. My
belief was that it was not only his right but his duty to do
anything that the needs of the Nation demanded unless such action was forbidden by the Constitution or by the laws. Under
this interpretation of executive power I did and caused to be
done many things not previously done by the President and
heads of the departments. I did not usurp power, but i did
greatly broaden the use of executive power. In other words, I
acted for the public welfare. I acted for the common well-peing
of all ear people, whenever and in whatever manner was necessary,
unless prevented by direct constitutional or legislative prohibition.13
Reacting to this rather intrepid interpretation of executive powers,
William Howard Taft denounced the idea that the President was to play
the role of a 11 Universal Providence. 11

In a series of lectures given at

the University of Virginia after his Presidential term in 1915, Taft
stated:
The true view of the executive function, as I conceive it, is that
the President can exercise no power which cannot be fairly and
reasonably traced to some specific grant of:'. power or justly implied
and included with such express grant as proper and necessary to its
13rneodore Roosevelt~ Autobfography (New York: Macmillan, 1913)',

pp. 388-89.
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exercise. • • . There is no undefined residuum which he
can exercise because it seems to him to .be. i.n the public
interest, and there is nothing in the.Neagle case and its
definition of a law in the United Statl~ or in other precedents, warranting such an inference.
Later, in another section of the lecture, Taft returned to this theme
saying that
••• the view of ••• Mr. Roosevelt, ascribing an undefined residuum of power to the President is an unsafe
doctrine, and that it might lead under emergencies to results of an arbitrary character, doing irremediable injustice to private right. The mainspring of such a view is
that the executive is charged with responsibility for the
welfare of a11 the'people in a general way, and thqt he is
to play the part of a Universal Providence and set all
thi.ngs right and that anything that in his judgment will help
the people he ought to do, unless he is expressly forbidden
to do it. The wide field of action 1;hat this would give to
the Executive one can hardly limit.
What is posited as theory is not always carried out in practice.
During his presidential term, Taft withdrew without statutory authority
large tracts of oil lands in California and Wyoming from private appropriation.

He did ask Congress to ratify his withdrawal of these lands,

but Congress failed to comply with the request.

In 1915, while Taft

was busy building a stro.ng case for an "express powers" theory at the
University of Virginia, the Supreme Court sustained the President's
order in United

States·v~·Midwest

Oil

·co. on the grounds that weight
11

11

be given to the 11 1ong-continued action of the Executive Department--on

the assumption that unauthorized acts would not have been allowed to be
so often repeated as to crystallize into a regular practice. 11

In other

words, since Congress didn't challenge the President's action, the Presi-

T~ft; ·our'Chi.ef Ma~istrate and His Powers _{_New York:
Columbia University Press, 1916), pp. 13 -140.
15 Ibid., pp. 144..,45
14wi11iam Howard

'

:f

-12dent could, "in conformity with the tacit consent of Congress, withdraw
in the public interest, any public land from entry or location by private parties."
In what seems to be a sharp contrast to the broad license the doctrine of inherent executive powers received in the.Neagle, Debs, and
Midwest cases, there stands the Supreme Court's decision in.Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer (1952).
Seizure Case were as follows.

The facts in the Steel

The United States had been at 11 war 11

in Korea for nearly eighteen months, when the negotiation of a collective bargaining contract between the steel industry and their employees
reached an impasse.
America ..gave

notic~

On December 18, 1951, the United Steel Workers of
that it would strike on December 31.

On December

22, President Truman, acting under the Defense Production Act of 1950
(as amended), referred the dispute to the Wage Stabilization Board.
The Wage Stabilization Board failed to bring a settlement, and the
steel workers• union called for a strike on April 9, 1952.

In a radio

message on April 8, the President announced the issuance of Executive
Order 10340 which directed Secretary of Commerce Charles Sawyer to
seize the steel industry and maintain production. Truman went on to
say that he did not invoke the "period of waiting" provisions of the
Taft-Hartley Act, because the strike would have been averted if the
steel industry had accepted the recomfflendations of the Wage Stabilization Board. The order, then, cited no specific statutory authorization, but rested on Truman's contention that a nation-wide strike of
steel workers would imperil the national defense, and the President's
invocation of the general powers vested in him "by the Constitution
and laws of the United States, and as President of the United States.
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and Corrnnander-in-Chief of the armed forces of the United States. 11 16 On
April 9, Truman sent a message to Congress reporti_ng his action, and, in
effect, asked Congress to approve or supersede his order. 17 On April

21., the President again sent a message to Congress, saying that "Congress
can, if it wishes, reject the course of action that I have followed in
this matter. 11 18 Congress failed to take any official action.
Meanwhile, the steel industry was honoring the President's

order-.~

but under protest as several of the companies had brought suit _against
Secr~tary

Sawyer in the District of Columbia district court, prayi.ng

for declaratory judgment,.a·nd injunctive relief.

On Apr:i.J 30, District

Court Judge David Pine ruled that Executive Order 10340 was unconstituti-0nal.

Later in the day, the District Court of Appeals, in a five-

four decision, voted to stay the injunction ordered by the district
court, pending a review by the Supreme-·:court. That Court_ granted certiorari on May 3 and handed down a six-three decision on June 2,

whi~h

affirmed the lower court's ruling. The complexity of the Steel Seizure Case -iS shown by the fact that
nine justices filed seven opinions which filled 131 pages in the United
19
States Reports.
Justice Black delivered the "opinion of the Court"
with Justices Frankfurter, Douglas, Jackson, Burton and Clark concurring
in separate opinions.
Minton joined,

Chief Justice Vinson, with whom Justices Reed and

delive~ed

the dissenting opinion.

16 cited in Alan F. Westin, The Anatomy of a Constitutional Law Case
(New York: Macmillan, 1958), p.
17 aa Cong. Rec. No. 60, 3962-63 (April 9, 1952); cited in Roche,
"Executive Power and Domestic Emergency," p. 612.
1898 Cong. R;c. No. 66, 4192 (April 21, 1952); cited by Roche, p. 612.-

19343 U.S. 579-710 (1952).

-14In an article written·for the.Western Po1itical'Qllarterly, Glenden
A. Schubert notes that the Courtis decision in the·vounSstewn

cas~

is

"somethfng considerably less than the sum of the parts. ••20 The reason
for the fragmentation of the·majority opifiton is primarily the result
of Justice Black's ·rigid interpretatton of the separation of powers
doctrine.

tablishfog the premise that "the President's power, if any, to issue the
order must stem either from an act:.of Co.ogress or frOm the Constitution
itself •11 Working on the first half of this pro·position, Black deduces
that the President's power didn't stem from an act of Congress because:
there was no express statutory authority for the President·' s order; there
~fairly

I'. I
I

be

implied;" the President could have applied the Selective Service' Act of
1948, the Defense Production Act of 1950, or the "cao1i.ng-off" provisions
of the Taft-Hartley Act; and finally, Congress had rejected an amendment
for seizure authority when it was considering the Taft-Hartley Act in
1947. Therefore, an express delegation of power must be found in the
Constitution which would authorize the President's seizure order. B·lack
reasoned that the President had no claim to status as Commander-irr-Cnief,
because the job of takiny possession of private! property fo order to
keep labor disputes from stopping production is "for the ·Nati"on's lawmakers, not for its military authorities." Nor could the President
invoke the "faithful execution of laws" clause, because his lawmaking
20Glendon A. Schubert, ·"The Steel Case~-. P.r"es:idential .Responsibility
and Judicial Irresponsibility, 11 ·western.-Politieal: ·uarterl , VI (1953)',
pp~ 63-4. 'An argument along sirn1 ar
nes 1s put ort y award s.
Corwin, "The Steel Sei.zure Case: A Judicial Brick Without Straw, 11 in
Robert" G. McCfosRey (ed.), E-ssays in Constitutiona:t·"Law; pp. 257~74 •.

;

ii

.I

.. I

.Ii

"

He sets up an exercise in deductive logic by first es-

were no statutes on the books from which such power could

I

.",.:
.

J

'

I
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'

I'I

I

functions are limited by the Constitution "to the recorrmendi.ng of laws
he thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he thinks bad." Since only
Congress can make statutes, the seizure order cannot stand because it

I~

is like a law--it proclaims policy as rules and regulations to be

I',I
i~

followed.

I

In deviating from his deductive framework, Black concludes his

opinion by saying:
The Founders of the Natton entrusted the lawmaking .. power ta Congress
alone in both bad and good times. It would do no good to reca.11
the historical events, the fears of power and hopes for freedom
that lay behind their choice. Such a review would but confirm our
holding that his seizure order cannot stand.
Justice Douglas was

basicall~

of the same view as Black, but added

the consideration that a constitutional seizure under the fifth Amendment would entail the power to make "just compensation.. " Congress., which
has the power to raise revenues and thus pay compensation, "is the only
one able to authorize· a seizure or make lawful one that the Pr.esident
had effected." As Douglas saw it, if the Court sustained the steel
seizure, "it would be reading Article II as. givi.ng the President not only
the power to execute the laws, but tp make some."
Justice Frankfurter had great difficulty accepting the hard-line
stand taken by 131ack qnd Douglas, and prefa-ced Ms opinion with a warning
to the other majority justices that "the consideration relev.ant to the
legal enforcement Qf the principle of

seRara~ion

pf pewers seem to me

.more complicated aru:f flexible than may appear from what Mr. Justice
Bhck has written." He

wen~

on to sugges.t that the steel

s~eizure

issue

could be met "without attempting to define the President's powers comprehensively." The advice given by Frankfurter was apparently taken by
the other majority. justices, since in the rest of the concurri.ng opinions
one not only finds a rejection of Black's rigid separation· of powers in'•

I

I

.

-16terpretation but also the issue of using executive powers in meeting an
emergency either being avoided or dea1t with in what might best be
described as 11 open 11 terms.
For the most part, the thrust of Frankfurter's epinion is an analytical review of various congressional actions which pertained to the
President's seizure powers.
11

Frankfurter draws the conclusion that

Congress deemed seizu·re so drastic a power· as to require that it be

carefully circumscribed whenever the President was vested with this
extraordinary authority. 11 Focusing upon the proceedings which surrounded
the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act. he suggests that Congress had
11

expressed its wi11 11 to withhold the seizure power from the President

11

as though it has said so in so many words. 11 In the case of Executive

Order 10340, Frankfurter didn't claim that the

~resident

.1

was without

the. genera1 powers to meet domestic eme.rgencies, but avoided the issue
by saying that Congress had preempted the seizure power when it had
been consideri_ng the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act.
Justice Burton devoted his opinion to an analysis of the Defense
Production Act and the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947. Burton
reached the conclusion that the President's order had violated "the
essence of the principle of the separation of governmental powers, 11
because Congress had provided a policy, exclusive of seizure, which
the President could have followed in meeting the emergency. Burton,
like Frankfurter, avoided defining the scope of inherent. executive
powers by simply saying, 11 Co.ngress has reserved to itself the right to

1.

..11I

determine where and when to authorize the seizure of property in
meeti_ng such an emergency. 11
'

Justice Clark a_rgued that Co.ngress had provided specific procedures

I
I

r1
I
!

-17to deal with the emergency in the Taft-Hartley, Defense Production and
Selective Service Acts.

Under the provisions of the Selective Service

Act. Clark maintained that the President could have ordered the

steel~

indu.stry to produce the necessary war material; and if this had failed,
there would have been statutory authorization for a seizure.

Congress,

then, has the power to deal with emergencies, but in the absence of
legislation "the President's independent power to act depends upon the
gravity of the situation confronting the nation."
Perhaps, the most interesting opinion of the majority justices is
that of Justice Jackson's. 21 Jackson suggested that the President's
power could be weighed by considering the "practical aspects of the
situation in which he acts.
1. When the President's action is consistent with and under the
delegation of congressional authority, his constitutional power is the
strongest.
In these circumstances, and in these only, may he be said (for what
it may be worth) to personify the federal sovereignty. If his act
is held unconstitutional under these circumstanies, it usually
means that Federal Government as an undivided whole lacks power.
2.

When the President's action is without expressed legislative au-

thority, the legitimacy of his power depends upon practical considerations •
. he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there
is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain.
Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may

21Jackson's op1n1on is, to put it mildly, a source of deep controversy.
For example, Corwin writes: "Justice Jackson's rather desultory opinion
contains little that is of direct pertinence to the constitutional issue
. • . • ' "The Steel Seizure Case, p. 270. On the other hand, Roche claims
that Jackson "wrote a superb concurring opinion which, it is to be regretted,
was not the 'op.:inion of the court; 111 in "Executive Power and Domestic
Emergency, p. 615.
11

11
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sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not
invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility.
In this area, any actual test of power is likely to depend
on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables
rather than on abstract theories of law.

!

3.

1!

Finally, Jackson states that when the President 1 s action is

in conflict 11 with the expressed or implied will of Congress, 11 his power
is at its 11 lowest ebb. 11
.•• he can only rely upon his own constitutional powers
minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the
matter. Courts can sustain exclusive Presidential control
in such a case by disabling the Congress from acting upon
the subject. Presidential claim to a power at once so
conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution,
for what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our
constitutional system.
In two short paragraphs, Jackson found that the President's action
in this case belonged in the third category. The President's action
could not be placed in the first category, because there was no express
statutory delegation of seizure power.

It did not fall in the second

category as the President's action was in conflict with the policies
expressed by Congress in the Selective Service, Defense Production and
Labor Management Relations Acts.

Therefore, the Court could "sustain

the President only by holding that seizure of such strike-bound industries is within his domain and beyond control by Congress. 11
Jackson then procedded to deal with what he considered to be the
real dilemma of the Steel Seizure Case:
The appeal, however, that we declare the existence of inherent powers 1 ex necessitate• to meet an emergency asks us to do
what many think would be wise, although it is something the
forefathers omitted. They knew what emergencies were, knew the
pressures they engender for authoritative action, knew, too,
how they afford a ready pretext for usurpation. We may also
suspect that they suspected that emergency powers would tend to
kindle emergencies . • • .
What conditions necessitate the exercise of inherent executive powers in

,.
\

.I
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an emergency? For Jackson, the constitutionality of the President's
steel seizure was found by striking a balance among three related variables. First, did the steel workers' strike necessitate the Presi-

l

dent's seizure of the steel mills without specific statutory authori-

I

I

'1

zation? Second, did existing legislation provide the President with
viable alternatives in which to combat the eme.rgency? And finally,

II

if the Court did sustain the steel seizure, would not its decision
upset the

wor~ings

I

'

I

of a government of "balanced" powers by affordfog

the President a ready pretext for usurpation? Jackson was not refutfog
the claim of inherent executive powers but was s.u.ggesting that the
gravity of the situation did not warrant the President~s action. 22 In
view of these considerations, Jackson closes his opinion by saying:
11

I cannot be brought to believe that this country will suffer if the

Court refuses further to aggrandize the presidential office, already
so portent and so relatively immune from judicial review, at the expense
of Congress."
~I

.I

Chief Justice Vinson launched the dissenting opinion reproaching
the majority:

1

"Those who suggest that this is a case involving extra-

ordinary powers should be mindful that these are extraordinary 'times.

11

'I

II
"~.

It was Vinson's view that although Congress had not declared war, it
had provided military procurement and anti-inflation legislative programs in support of the Korean effort and aRy stoppage in steel produc22with the benefit of hindsight, Schubert sees the gravity of the
situation in a different light: · The strike began immediately after the
announcement of the Supreme Court's decision, and lasted almost two months.
The Korean war also continued unabated; the elimination of steel produc.tion ahd obviously resulted in both a ser~ous cut in defense and munitions
production and widespread bottlenecks whose effect, in terms of the domestic economy, wou-1d be highly inflationary; the.grave possibility.of·a fullscale war with the·u.s~·s~R~ remained· unchanged;" The Steel Case," p; 61.
11

11

/,

I

I

-20tion would seriously imperil these defense programs.

He maintained

that the purpose of the President's seizure was "to faithfully execute
the laws by acting in an emergency to maintain the status quo, thereby
preventing collapse of the legislative programs until Congress could
act. 11 The President was not attempting to defy Congress, because he
sent a message to Congress, immediately following the seizure order,
explaining his action and expressing a "desire to cooperate with any
legislative proposals, approvals, regulating or rejecting the seizure
of the steel mills. 11

:1

Vinson believed that the President exhausted the legislative remedies available to him for averting a strike, when he had referred the
dispute to the Wage Stabilization Board under the authority of the Defense
Production Act and settlement had failed.

The argument, that an emer-

gency did not exist until the Taft-Hartley procedures had been exhausted,
was invlaid, since the settlement procedures of the Taft-Hartley and
Selective Service Acts were 11 route(s) parallel to, not connected with,
the WSB procedure." After mediation by the Wage Stabilization Board
had failed to bring settlement, the President was "faced with immediate
national peril through stoppage in steel production on the one hand, and
faced with the destruction of the wage and price legislative programs on
the other.

II

In an argument similar to the ones found in the Neagle, Debs and
Midwest cases, Vinson posited that the Article II grant of executive
power gives the President the proper authority for seizing the steel
mills.

Although the President was without statutory authorization,

I.
"

his action "was consistent with his duty to take care that the laws be
faithfully executed." After drawing a number of illustrations from past

i

. j

.II ~,
'

I

:I
!

!

-~.)

.
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presidential acts, Vinson ·concluded his opinion with the fo.ilowing ·comment on the hi story of ·Uexecutive 1ea:dershtp:"

• the fact that

II

Congress and the courts ·nave consiStently reco·gn'fzed and· given· thei_r
support to such executive act'fon indicates that such a power of seizure
has been accepteq throughout our history.

11

Indeed, the Court 1 s decision .'in the.Steel Seizure Case imposed no
serious limitations on the Presidentts "emergency" powers. Justices
Black and Douglas were the only members of the Court to deny the constitutionality of the
of .inherent powers.

President~s

power to meet an emergency by exercise

Justtc·es Frankfurter and Burton, reserved judgment

on the nature and scope of inherent executive powers.

Justices Clark
'I

i
I'

and Jackson gave their approval to the exercise of implied powers as
long as there was an absence of express congressional policy.

The·three

dissenting justices, as previously noted, fully accepted the doctrine
of inherent executive powers and its application to the case.

Therefore,

a majority of at least five justices accepted the constitutionality of
inherent executive powers.

I4

I

·l

If this is so, why didn't the President's
I

J

seizure of the steel mills stand?

l

.1

I

In Youngstown the fundamental.issue of express versus inherent
executive powers was buried beneath the circumstances of the case.

I

'l
•I

l

'l

Schubert makes the point we11 when he says that there was an "assumption
of a majority of the Court that the circumstances under which this case
arose were those of normalcy . . . 1123 The majority s as.Sumption of
1

"normalcy" was a major factor

why

the· question of inherent executive

powers was avoided and the case decided on a less controversial issue.
I

23

I

Schubert, 11 The Steel Case, 11 p. 74.

I

"l

I

I

"~ '\

.

.. 22The Court 1 s decision in Youn9S>town was that tfte seizure·pewe.r, a power
'

the President might have otherwise, had .• was preempted in this particular
case when Congress had considered aod rejected an amendment for seizure
authority in passing the Taft ... Hartley·Act.24 · As Edward Corwin puts it,
the case was a ujudic'ia l brick.
possess 'residualt or

1

wtJ:hou~

straw • • . That the president does

resuitant 1 powers over and above, or in conse ...

quence of,.his specifically granted powers to take tem,porary al1eviative
action in the presence of serious: emergency is a proposition to which
all but Justices Black and Douglas would probably have assented in the
absence of the complicatin.9

tsSJJe that was. created by the presic;lent' s re-

fusal to follow the.procedures laid down in the. Taft-HartJey Act. 1125
Nearly twenty years after Youngstown, theissue of .express versus
inherent executive powers again returned to the Supreme C.ourt in New York
Times Co. v. United States.26

This·tiJTle the question was cloaked in a

First Amendment issue, and it was the President who was.seeking an injunction against a company, not

11

vice ·versa 11• as in Youngstown.

the facts of the case were as follows.

On June 13,

~he

Briefly,

New York Times

published the first installment of what has become known as the Pgntagon

,.l,

Papers-..a previously top secret, forty-seven volume history of the United
States~

role in Indoc-hina over a period of three decades.

One June 15,

the Justice Department requested an injunction t.o halt further publication,
contending that it would cause

11

irreparable injury 11 to the national defense.

24Pritcbett~ The American Constitution, p. 341; and Schubert,
Steel Case,·~ pp. 72 ... 4.
25 corwin,

p. 273.

11

The Steel Seizure Case:

26 403 u.~. 713 (1971).

11

'fhe

A Ju.dicial e-rick Without Straw, 11

i
I
11

I

II

... 23The same day Dist.r:ict. Cou-rt Judge Gurfein in New YorR tssued
restraining order against t.he Ttmes pending a hearing. - On

Q.

'_preliminary

Jt,m~

19_, Judge

Gurfein denied the reques,t to enjoin the Times., but the Federal appellate
c.ourt in New York imme<;liatel1

reass~rted

In the interim period?, the Washington

the stay pending a hearing.
~ost

began printing more

leaked sections of t,he Pentason. Pagers on J.une 18. · The Justice Department promptly so.ught an injunction against the Post, which Judge Gesell
of the District Court for th.e. District of Columbia declin_ed to grant.
The following day the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
ordered the Post to halt publication

~f

·the papers and remanded the case

to Judge Gesell for a hearing Qn the government's reque_st for an in•
junction.

On June 21, Gesell again denied a prelimi_nary inju_nction and

again the Justice Department appealed his decision.

On June 23, the

Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court 1 s decision but extende.d the
restraining order to permit the government to appeal to the Supreme Court.
The same day the Court of .Appeals in New York allowed the .Times to resume
public;ation of the papers, but remanded the case to. Judge Gurfein for
proceed'{ngs to. determine those items in the papers t_hat would be dangerous
to the national security.
On June 25, the Supreme Court granted certiora_ri bqth to the Times
an~

to the government in the Washington Post case.

On

J~ne

30, the Court

handed down a six-three decision which dissolved the injunctions and the
newspapers were free to resume publication.
paragraph
11

11

As brief as the Court's three

per curiam 11 opinion was, it can be condensed to the following:

tAny system of prior restraints of expression . . "

(bears}. a heavy

presumption against its constitutional validity, 11127 and in this case the
27The-Court here cites Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58,
70 (1963); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).

},,
I
I

government d_idn tt meet tliE:! IHf:iurden of show\ng justtfi'catton for the
tmposltton of s:uch a :restra,.tnt. ~· 11 .28

In a maze of cross-concurrences,

Justices Blac-k, Doug] as_, .Br.en-nan, Ste.wart, White and Marsha 1l each
wrote, a concur.t;ing opinoi.n., .wntl e thief Justice Bur.9-er amt Justices
.Harlan p.nd Blackman each wrote

,a

dissenting opinion, principa.lly

protesting the amount. of time the Justices had to think about the
case.
The meat of Justice B:lack's opindcim is a response to ·the oral
a_rgument made· by S0 lic 'f.tor General Griswo 1d.
that

11 .to~re

I

Gri swo 1d .fiad asserted

I

I

are other parts of tfle Constitution that grant power· and

I

I

I',!

respoFlsibilittes to. the Executive . . • the First.Amendment was not
intended to m.ake it impossible for the Executive to functii:>n or. to protect the security of the Untted States. 1129

Suprisingly, Black did not

cite from the Youngstown case, but responded to Griswold's assertion by
saying that;
The Government do~s.not eveR attempt to rely on any act of Congr.ess.
Instead, it makes the bold and dangerously far-reaching contention
tha~ th~ c;ourts should take .it upon themselves t<l 'make 1 ·a law
abridging freedom of the press in the name of equity, presidentia 1
power-and national. s~curity, even when the representatives of the
people in Congress have adhered to the command of the First Amendment and refused to make such a law . . . . Ta.find that the President has 'inherent power' to halt the publication of new by resort
. to the courts would wipe out the First Amendment and destroy the
fundamental 1i berty and security of the very people th~ G.overnment
hopes to make 'secur~.·
Black's position is' quite clear:

the First .Amendment is abs'ol:ute; neither

Congress nor the President has ~he power~ i~herent or e~press~ to ~bridge

28 Here,' ttle Court cited Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe,
402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971).

29 Gri.swold 1 s .quote is found. in ~he text of;Bla,ck's oprn.1on;, f.or
Griswqld's full ~statement, s.ee The.Pentagon Papers (New Yo.r.k.: Quadrangle
!9?1), p. 721.

,.
~

~

''}"•
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the freedom of the press, 30
Justice Douglas concurred with Black and opened his opinion with
the claim that the First Amendment "leaves, in my view, no room for
governmental restraint on the press, 11 and in any event, there were 11 no
statute(s}u which barred the publication of the material the newspapers
sought to use.

Douglas proceeds to the proposition that any power that
11

the Government possesses must come from its 'inherent power. 111 quoting.
from Hi'rabayashi v. United States, he said that

11

(t)he power to wage

war is 'the power td wage war successfully, tn31 and added that 11 the
war power stems from a declaration of war·.

The Constitution by Article

l, sec. 8, gives Congress, not the PY'esident, power -!,to declare war.•
Nowhere are presidential wars authorized.

We need not decide therefore

what leveling effect the war power of Congress might'have. 11
Gtven the cros:s..-concurrences· of Black. and Douglas and tlie persuasive
language of their 'Opinions in both thts case and that of Yourigstowrt, it
seems fair to say that they subscribe to two separate principles:

(1) the

First Amendment absolutely forbtds injunctions .against the publ icat1on

of news; and (2) in any event, the President has no inherent power
to seek or obtain an injunction.32 Like Youngstown, the other majority
30rn a footnote, Black cites Madison: "If they (the first ten
amendments) are incorporated into the Constitution, independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the
guardians of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark against
every assumption of pow~r in the Legislative or Executive; they will
naturally be led to resist every encroachment upon rights expressly
stipulated for in the Constitution by the decl.aration of rights; 11
l Annals of Congress 439 (1834).
31320 U.S. 81, 93.
32Peter D. Junger, "Down Memory Lane: The Case of the Pentagon
Papers," a repY'-int from Case Western Law Review 23 (November, 1971),
p.20.
./

'I

d
1ii

justices had a difficult time acceptt.ng the hard ..ltne stand taC<en by
Black and Douglas.

It is su.ggested that in New York Times the Court 1 s

decision turns on the cross.concurring -Opinions of Justices Stewart
and White. One one hand, White clearly disavows any absolute effect to
the First Amendment.

On the other, Stewart posits that th.e President

has the r_ights, and the constitutional duty":'- as a matter of sovereign
11

perogative and not as a matter of law as the courts know law--through the
promulgamation and enforcement of executive regulations, to protect the
confidentiality necessary to carry out (his) resp.onsibil ities in the
fields of international relations and national defense.
In an opinion with wh.ich. Stewart

j~ined,

11

Justice White began with a

sunmary of his .conclu.sions:
I do not say that in no circumstances would the First Amendment
permtt an injunctton _against publ ishi.ng information about. govern ...
ment plans- or operattons, • , • I am ccmftde.n:t tfi.at ... , di:s.clo·
sut!e(of these documents wtll do substantial damage to puolic
interests. N)evertfieless •• ,. the United States has not satisfied
the very heavy burden wh'ich it. must meet·~to warrant an injunction
.against publication in these cases, .at least in the absenc.e of
ex ress·and·a ro rtatel limited Con ressional authorization for
· prtor·re~~raints tn·ctrcumstahces Sijch as these. emphasis added

•I
'II

"

Go\ng further, he states:

.I

At least in the absence of legislation by Congress, based on its
own investigations and findings, I am quite ·unable to agree that
the inherent powers of the Executive and thec.our-ts reach so far
as to authorize remedies having such sweeping potential for in·
hibiting publication of the press.
·

'•

,,

Although it appears that the main support for Justice White's

I

opinion is the lack of inherent authority in the E~ecutive, 33 he goes
on to discuss the First Amendment and the standards which should be
applied in granting injunctions against the press.

While the discµssion

33 For example, it is Peter Junger's view that White's opinion is
ubased clearly- and solely on the laGk of inherent power in the Executive;
op~ cit., pp. 24-6 and pp. 38-9. ·

11

is dedkated to an analysts- of the legislattve history of the Espionage
Act of 1917 and a summary of .c'dminal provisions which might apply to the
publication of the papers, it also suggests the existence of some inherent
executive authority since White views the First Amendment as a constitutional prohibition on the extent of that authority. Moreover, because
White concurred in Justice Stewart's opinion, his vote can best be understood

oy

undertaki~g

,,

an analysis of that opinion.

Justice Stewart's opinion is concerned primarily with the inherent
power of the Presidency. A review of the opinion leaves little doubt
that the President does have inherent power.

Stewart began his opinion
'

.,

noting that ttin the governmental structure created by our Constitution_,

by

the Executive is endowed with enormous power in the. two reaated areas of
national defense and international relations. This power, largely uncnecked by the Legtslattve and Judicial branches has

~een pre~sed

to tne

very !lilt since the advent of the missile age. 11 He proceeded to pOint
out that in the absence of those"gover.nmental checks.and balances 11 which
are normally present, the onlJ effective restraint u.pon executive pol icy
11

.,
11;!

I

and power in the areas of national defense and international affairs may
lie 1n an enlightened citizenry . . • • 11 For Stewart,

then~

there is a

problem between t.he near absolute power of the President with respect to
national defense and foreign affairs and a greater nee.d in these areas for
the freec;lom of the press that

is:~assured

by the First Amendment.

~:1

But such

'I

a problem is not for the courts to resolve, at least not in the Post and
11

11

I

Times cases.
[I]n the cases_before us we are asked neither to construe specific
regulations nor to apply specific laws. We are· asked, instead, to
perform a function that the Constitution gave to the Executive, not
the Judiciar,y. We are asked, quite simply, to prevent the publ ication o'f material that the Executive Branch insists should not,
1n the natfonal interest, be published. I am convinced that the

,,

'I

"'II
I

·I

"!

~

'

:~~

I
II

\I
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Executtve ts correct witn respect to some of the documents involved. But I cannot say tnat disclosure of any of them will
surely result in direct, immediate and irreparable damage to
our Nation or its people. That being so, there can under the
First Amendment be but one judicial resolution of the issues
before us. I join the judgments of the Count.
Thus, the test of 11 direct, immediate, and irreparable damage 11 might
overcome the obstacle of the First Amendment, but in this case one
cannot see how it could authorize the courts without a law to enforce.
And, since Justice White concurred in it, one can only conclude that
he too would allow restraints in those cases where there was merit to
the

Executive~s

claim of damage to the national interest.

Justice Marshall concurred.

His only reference to the First

Amendment was to deny that it raises the ultimate issue in these cases.
11

11

Addressing himself to the separation of powers issue, he leaves no doubt
as to the power of the Prestdent to _restrain the disclosure of informa ..
tton tn the interest of nattonal security.
The problem here is whether in this particular case the Executive
Branch has authority to invoke the equity jurisdiction of the courts
to protect what it believes to be the national interest •.••
[I]n some situations it may.be·that under whatever inherent powers
the Government may have, as well as the implicit authority derived
from the Presidentts mandate to conduct foreign affairs and to
act as Commander-in-Chief there is a basis for the invocation of
the equity jurisidction of this Court as a.n aid to prevent the
publication of material damaging to "national security, however
that term may· be defined.
It would, however, be utterly inconsistent with the concept of
separation of power for this Court to use its power of contempt
to prevent behavior that Congress has specifically declined to
prohibit. There would be a similar clamage to the basic concept
of these·co-equal branches of Government if when the Executive
Branch Bas adequate authority gr4nted by Congress to protect
"national security" it can choose instead to invoke the contempt
power of a court to enjoin the threatened conduct. The Constitution provides that Congress shall make laws, the President shall
execute laws, and courts interpret laws. (citing Youngstown) It
did not provide for government by injunction in which the courts
and the Executive Branch can make law" without regard to the action
of Congress.
11

11

Justice Brennan is the only remaining Justice concurring in the

I

I

l
I

1

majortt.ropinton,
Amendment.

Brenn~n~s

optnton is concerned only with the First

He stated that there are precedents 1ndicatlng that in

time of war, in an extremely narrow class of cases, prior restraints
may be placed upon the press.

He argued, however, that if there is

such an exception to the absolutes of the First Amendment neither the
proof or all_egations made 1n New York Times place the case within the
exception.

ttfor if the Executive Branch seeks judicial aid in

prevent~

tng publication, it must inevitably submit the basis upon which that
aid is sought to scrutiny by the judiciary.

11

Thus, this sta.tement can

be read as saying that if the executive branch had shown facts falling
within the exception, then it might have been entitled tq the injunction.
It is not necessary to consider the dissenting opinions of Chief
Just ice Burger and Just ice Bl acl<mun; as has been pointed out, tne.ymere.ly suggest that the Justices: needed more time to think about the
case.

However, since Justice Harlan 1 s opinion, in which the Chief

Justice and Justice Blackmun concurred, does address itself to the
merits of the case, it is appropriate to touch on that opinion here.
Simply put, i.t was Harlan 1 s opinion ·that the Executive had the power,
with.out specific congressional sanction, to seek ang obtain the injunction against the publication of the Pentagon Papers.
As Harlan saw it, the power to obtain the injunction was in the
Executive 1 s power to conduct the nation's foreign affairs.

The Executive,

then, had the right to the injunction since ... the subject matter of the

~.,

,,
:1

dispute was within the proper compass of the President's. foreign relations
power.

11

For precedents supporting this position, Harlan cited (1) the

executive ~s _privilege to refuse to disclose to either Congress or the

'----------------------------------------------

-- -

I

Ii•

.,.3Q..

courts 1nformat1on relattng
to forefgn
affairs or the national de.
. .
fense; 34 (2} relations with foreign powers which have no direct effect
upon domestic interests; 35 and (3} matters· which, to the extent they
affect domestic interests, do so with the authorization of Congress. 36
In New York Times, there were two constitutional questions that
could have been answered.

The first question was whether the Govern-

ment as a whole could restrain the publication of

~he

Pentagon_ Papers

despite the First Amendment. Assuming that the Government could re•
strain publication, the next query was whether the Executive has the
power to fmpose such restratnts without congressional authorization.
Since the Court did refuse to permit the restraint, it would seem that
the basis for its decision has to be a negative answer to one or both
of the questions posed.

But when adding and subtracting the opinions

of the various Justi'ces, the synthests which appears su.ggests that
neither of the constitutional considerations standing by itself was
determinative of the case.
What one does find in the synthesis is a weighing of the damage
which might be suffered by the unational interest" against both the
First Amendment and the separation of powers question.

And it follows

without close reading of the Times case that the damage did not warrant

34united States v. Re.Ynolds, 345 U.S. l (1953).
35 10 Annals of Congress 613 (1800}; a statement by John Marshall
on the floor of the House of Representatives.
36United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp .• , 299 U~S. 304 (1936);
conviction of offense created by Joint Resolution of Congress was proper
despite arguments that the Joint Resolution was an unconstitutional de-legation of authority by Congress to the President.
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the granting of

~n

tnjunctton ,against the puoltcat1on of the papers.

Perhaps, thts was Just tee White t-s. position when he stated that the
11

United States had not satisfted the very heavy burden which it must
meet to warrant an injunctfon against publication in these cases, at
least in absence of express and appropriately limited Gongressional
authorization for prior restraints in circumstances such as these.

11

The Courtts balancing of considerations in New York Times--and in
Youngstown~~has

led Peter Junger to posit that there is only one prin-

ciple that can be derived from the two cases:

11

The doctrine of the

separation of powers denies the Executive the constitutional power to
take acti6n on his own authorization if that action would be of do4btful
constitutionality had it been authorize<;! by Congress. 1137
Jungerts po'int, I beJieve, is well t;aken if one considers the
si.rntlartttes between the two cases.

First, like Youngstown, there was
I

a major"tt.r assumption that the ctrcumstances of the Times case arose

wer~

declared by Congress and in both cases the Executive

argued that the war made his actions necessary.

~

I

'!

under· a situation of 11 norma lcy. 11 Neither the Korean 11 war 11 nor the
Vtetnam "war 11

!

;I,' I
'
"'

'

In Youngstown, the

steel plants.were seized to prevent a strike that supposedly would have
catastrophic effects on the war effort.

In New York Times, the execu-

tive branch justified the censorship upon the grounds that the publication of the papers would have adverse effects on the

~onduct

of the war,

I

as well as our relations with other countries.
The second similarity is

th~t

I
I

in both cases the Court dealt with

the problem of inherent executive powers on

and~ad

hoc basis.

In Youngs-

,I
ii

II

37 Junger", "Down Memory Lane:

The Case of the Pentagon Papers, p. 38.
11
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~he

question was whether the Executive had the inherent power to

setze the nation•s steel mills.

And, as pointed out above, one of the

questions in New York Times was whether the Executive had the inherent
power to censor the press.
A third and final similarity38 between the two cases rests in
Justice Holmest .famous·admonition;

"Great cases like hard cases make bad

1aw. • . • tt 39 Whereas Just1ces Harl an and Bl ackmun accused New York Times
of being a great case, and therefore a maker of bad law, one commentator
described Youngstown as 11 the legal battle of the century. u40 In terms of
11

greatness, 11 both cases received massive attention in th.e press and
'

appeared at the time to involve questions of major national importance.
In New York Times, the press was understandbly enough almost unanimously
opposed to the Executivets attempts to censor some of tts members.
ctng about

Xo~n9stown

Reminis-

tn nts Memoirs, President Truman recalled that there were

few instances in history where the press was more sensational
or partisan •• , • What was more disturbing was what amounted
to editorial intervention by the press of America in a case
pending before the Supreme Court of the United States. News
stor1:es and editorials. • • inflaming public opin"ton were pre-

38This is not to say other· similarities do not exist. For example,
the progression of Youngstown an.d New York Times were both remarkably···
swift, and in both cases, the decision of the Court was riddled witn
numerous opinions.
3911 ••• great cases are called great, not by reason of their real
importance in shaping the law of the future, but because of some accident
of immedia.~e overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings and distorts the jud.gment. These immediate interests exercise a k.ind of hydrau1ic pressure which makes what previously was clear seem doubtful, and
before which even well settled principles of law will ben; 11 dissent in in
Northern Securities Co. v. United States 193 U.S. 197, 400-01 1904 •
40J. Banks, 11 SteeT, Sawyer and the .Executive Power, 11 14 U. Pitt L.
Rev. (1953); cited by Junger, p. 29. Junger points out that Banks was
counsel for Jones and Lauglin Steel Corporation in the Youngstown case.

''
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I
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judgfng and dectdtng tne case at the ~lry tfme the Court itself
was nearing arguments- for Both sides.
Despite the similarities between

th~

two cases, one cannot read

I

the opinions in New York Times without concluding that the First Amendment problem played a major role tn th.e process by which the majority .
reached its decision that publication of the Pentagon Papers could not
be enjoined.
concerning

The argument maqe hy Justices White, Stewart and Marshall

Congress~

evident past refusal to authorize injunctive re-

medies42 is one of two grounds forthe Court denying relief in Times.
The at.her ground is Justice Stewart's argument t.hat the Government
did not prove that the publication of the papers would "surely result
in direct, immediate and irreparable injury to (the} Nattun or its
people. 0 43 While tne emphasts of thts principle is: on- tf:te. "bnportance
I
I
I
I
I

of free expression, ttoobviously does not hold the First Amendment absolute, and thus recognizes that substantia 1 counterva tl ing state interests may outweigh the values of expression.

For this reason, the

I
I

balancing principle, which a majority of the Court apparently accepted, 44

I
I

would in some situations sanction actions resulting from executive

de~

I

.j

I
I
I
I

I
I

41ttarry s. Truman, Memoirs:
475; cited by Junger, p. 30

Years of Trial of Hope 'µ_ . (l 95,6}, p. ·

42 rn 1917, Congress rejected an amendment to the Esptonage Act
which would have given the President the power to prohtott, on patn of
fine or 'imprisonment, the publication of any material relating to the
national defense.
43see suprq, pp. 27-28.
44Justice Douglas, Brennan and White would presumably concur in the
application of the standard proposed in Justice Stewart 1 s opinion for
purposes of denyi~g an injunction,

I

i

II
I'

.r
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terminations of threats to the nattonal security. 45
In sum, then, the CourttS- s-tresS" tn Ttrnes on the First Amendment
problem suggests that some constitutional questions are more to be
avotded than others. As Justice Frankfurter pointed out in Youngstown,
"It ought to be, but apparently is not, a matter of common understanding that clashes between different branches of the government should be
avoided if a legal ground of less explosive potentialities is available."
The Court could have decided that the Executive lacked the inherent
power to obtain the injunction against publication, but instead Times
turned on the question of whether a law passed by Congress authorizing
such an injunction would be constitutional. Thus, in the end, the
Pentagon Papers case imposes no serious limitations on the Executive
in terms of asserted powers. 46 The case, as William Van Alstyne puts
tt, was a l\const1tuti6nal anti: ..cl imax 0 in the respect th.at uin no sense
can it be said to have beltttled the executive power as that power was
understood the day before the decision came down. 47
11

Given the events called Watergate, the Supreme Court's decision in

45In an early analysis of the Pentagon Papers case, the Harvard
L,aw Review viewed the ba lanc'fng approach as an important development
in constitutional law, supporttng.its assessment with. the hypothettcal
situation where the publication of detailed plans of future military
operations or of sophisticated scient.ific data of military importance
would be of greater value to hostile foreign nations tharl.:to an informed
critique of .public policy; "Freedom of Speech, Press and Association,"
Harvard Law Review, 85 (1971), p. 205. .
·
46As Ju.nger notes, "An opponent of unrestrained executive power
would presumably have been happier if the first amendment had never
been mentioned in New York Times, in "Down Memory Lane: The Case of
tne Pentagon Papers, 11 p. 52.
11

47wil liam Van Alstyne, "A Political and Constitutional Review of
United States y. Nixon," repr'fnt from UCLA Law Review, 22 (October, 1974},

p. 116,
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i.

United States v . Ntxon 48 had its: roots in New York Times.

Pfri'l'tp B.

Kurland, who stresses- ttlis potnt at the beginning ·Of an art1c]e wrHten
for the UCLA Law·Reviewts symposium on the Nixon case, states that it
was the publication of tfle Pentagon Papers which 11 exacerbated the 'paranoia of tfle Nixon adtninistratton, that called forth the plumbers and
other extraconstitutional devices by a chagrined executive ••• Hence

i,

the Ellsoerg trial, the concealment of break-ins and wiretaps, and White
House behavior that looked suspiciously like an attempt to bribe a trial
judge with a different federal appointment. 1149 Having contributed tan. gentia l ly to the events of Watergate by its decisions in New York Times
and tne Democratic C9nvention

case~, 5 ° Kurland maintains that the Court

proceeded "to oust a President" in United States v. Nixon:
The Nixon case was rushed to decision skipping adjudication,
so that its effect would be plainly felt in the impeachment proce.sse~ tnat were.·under way.
Even before tne event, it was easy
to predtc~ tnat the Court's decision would be determinative of
the viability of .the Nixon presidency. The decision was reached
on July 24, 1974; the Htluse Judiciary Co1T111ittee voted impeachment
articles on the 31st of July and the 1st of August; the President
all but confessed his implication in the Watergate coverup when
he published the tapes ordered produced by the Cou5f' on August
5, 1974: the President resigned on August 9, 1974.

,.f

In United States v. Nixon, the Supreme Court for the first time
passed on the question of executive privilege for confidential
munications to which the President is a party.

com~~

While Kurland maintains

4894 S. Ct. 3090 (1974).
49Philip B. Kurland, "United States v. Nixon: Who Killed Cock
Robin? S.vnposium: United States v. Nixon (October, 1974; rpt. UCLA
Law Review XXII), pp .. 68-9.
-11

50otBrien v. Brown, 409 U.S. l (1972); ·Cousins v. Wigoda, 409 11.
1201 (1972) •
51Kurlanct, op. cit., p, 69.

s.
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on one hand that the Court was instrumental in ousting a President,
he concludes on the other that the Court's reasoning in United States

"

l

v. Nixon was good for that case only; the Nixon decision "purports to
justify a conclusion that the Court obviously thought necessary in the

J,

circumstances of the grim political situation with which the country
was faced," but it "hardly explicated the complicated concept of executive privilege and its proper and improper use. 11 52 Along these lines,
I think it can be said that United States v. Nixon, like New York Times,
was a "constitutional anti-climax" for the simple reason that claims
of inherent power always boil down to arguments based on necessity.

In

this case, the handwriting was on the wall. Thus, it is not surprising
that the Court rejected President Nixon's assertion of a

~generalized

privilege of confidentiality" under the circumstances of Watergate,
where it was not alleged that interests of national security or of

\

f

I
t

j

foreign relations were in any way involved.
To recall what is recent and well-known history, the District
Court for the District of Columbia issued a subpoena on the motion of
the Watergate special prosecutor directing the President to produce
certain tape recordings and documents relating to his conversations

.J
;.

i

with White House assistants, which were in connection with the trial
of ~even individuals 53 indicted for various offenses,. including con-

.l

spiracy to defraud the United States and the obstruction of justice.

l

~

f

52 Kurland, op. cit., p. 74.
53The seven defendants were John N. Mitchell, H. R. Haldeman, John
D. Ehrlichman, Charles W. Colson, Robert C. Mardian, Kenneth W. Parkinson, and Gordon Strachan. Each had occupied either a position of responsibility on the White House staff or the Conmittee for the Re-Election of the President.
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-37In response, the President's counsel filed a motion to quash the
subpoena, essentially arguing that the Executive had an absolute,
unreviewable, discretionary privilege to control the release of any
presidential tapes and documents.

The district court denied the Presi-

dent's motion to quash the subpoena, but stayed its order pending
appellate review.

The Supreme Court took the unusual step of granting

a writ of certiorari before judgment.
Writing for an unanimous Court,5 4 Chief Justice Burger affirmed
the decision of the lower court, holding that the President's claim
of absolute privilege to withhold tapes, unsupported by any claims
of need to protect military, diplomatic or sensitive national security

''

interests, could not prevail in view of the special prosecutor's demonstrated, specific need for the tape recordings and documents.
Before the Court dealt with the substantive issue of

executiv~~
.1

privilege, it had to establish its jurisdiction by dealing with the
issues of whether it was an 11 intra-branch 11 dispute.

Although the

Court dealt with each of these issues separately, any question of possible presidential immunity from judicial process was simply subsumed
into the substantive issues of the case.

Needless to say, all of

these preliminary matters were resolved in favor nf the Court's jurisdiction, though the reasoning left a great deal to be desired. 55

54Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision
of the case.
55For similar arguments along this line, see Kenneth L. Karst and
Harold W. Horowitz, "Presidential Prerogative and Judicial Review;" Paul
J. Mishkin, 11 Great Cases and Soft Law: A Comment on United States v.
Nixon;" and Kurland, o_.e. cit.; in Symposium: United States v. Nixon,,

, I
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It is believed that an analysis of any particular issue going to
the jurisdiction of the Court reveals the pattern of the Nixon opinion.
For this reason, I will only examine one issue of this type, "Justiciabil ity.11 The argument made by the President's counsel was that the
conflict between the Chief Executive and special prosecutor was "an
intra-branch dispute between a subordinate and superior officer of the
Executive Branch and hence not subject to judicial resolution. n56
Carried a step further, the counsel asserted teat since both officers
were of the Executive Branch, the issue was a "political question, 11
and not appropriate for the courts to decide.
In rejecting this conclusion, the Court first asserted that 11 a
claim of an 'intra branch dispute,• without more, has never operated
to defeat federal jurisdiction; justiciability does not depend upon
such a surface inquiry." The question then becomes what does justiciabil ity depend upon? What fol lows is oat, as Kurland puts,,it, "a principled answer but an ad hoc

respons~:

"-

In light of the uniqueeess of the setting in which the conflict arises, the fact that both parties are officers of the
Executive Branch cannot be viewed as a barrier to justiciabi1 ity. It would be inconsistent with the applicable law and:
regulation, and the un·ique facts of this case to conclude other
than that the Special Prosecutor has standing to bring this
action and that a justiciable controversy is presented for
decision.
Obviously, there is no room for doubt about the "uniqueness of
the setting, but, as Kurland ~nd others 58 point out, one can question
56The counsel's argument is cited by Burger, 94 S. Ct. 3100.

57 Kurland, op, cit., p. 71.
58 For example, see Mishkin, "Great Cases and Soft Law ••• , 11
pp. 81~2; and Alstyne, ".A Political and Constitutional Review of United
States v. Nixon, pp. 131-9.
11

'I

t
ri

I

-39-

I

I

the relevancy of "the applicable law 11 in view of the Court's citations. 59
The Court did proclaim thtt because the power of the Attorney General
was derived from Congress, 60 the special prosecutor had vested in him
the "explicit power to contest the invocation of executive privilege
in the process of seeking evidence deemed relevant to the performance
of these specially delegated duties.

Since the authority delegated

11

to the special proseoator had the force of !law," he had the power,
11

pursuant to the regulations set by Congress, to take the action in
question.

59For example, the Court, citing United States v. ICC, stated that
"whatever the correct answer on the merits, these issues are 'of a
type which are traditionally justiciable.'" 377 U.S., at 430. However,
as Alstyne points out: "(United States v. ICC) may well have been appropriate for the Supreme Court to cite in United States v. Nixon as a
first step in determining the Special Prosecutor's 'standing• to have
applied for a subpoena, but it is without value as to whether his representation ~fan exclusively executive interest (i.e., whether judicial
assistance should be sought to secure evidence for a prosecutive use)
may be preempted by the President of the United States, once the President
himself makes a direct assertion in court as Chief Executive that assistance by the court is not only not desired, but that he affirmatively
opposes it." In the same reference, Alstyne goes on to say that "United
States v. ICC said nothing whatever of course, as to whether the President
of the United States might have authoritatively preempted the Attorney
General in district court by entering an appearance on his own behalf,
as Chief Executive, to move that the proceeding should be qismissed.
Had he done so, the Court would then have had occasion to determine
whether anything other than a purely executive interest was involved,
a question not deemed necessary to consider at the time at all. The
President had made no such assertion; op. cit., n. 57, p. 134.
60The Court stated that under the authority of Ar?t. II, sec~ :.2,
Congress has vested in the Attorney General the power to conduct the
criminal li~igation of the United States Government. 28 U.S.C., sec.
516. It has also vested in him the power to appoint subordinated officers to assist him in the discharge of his duties. 28 U.S.C., secs.
509, 5JO, 515, 533. Acting pursuant to these statutes, the Attorney
General has delegated the authority to represent the United States in
these particular matters to a Special Prosecutor with unique authority
and tenure.
11

11

11
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I

What the 'Court seemed to be saying, although not in so many words,

,t

was that the Attorney General's regulation 61 provided the special prosecutor with the special safeguards of independence and tenure, since
Congress had validly vested in the Attorney General the power to prosecute and to appoint &lthers to assist hi.m.

Therefore, an intra11

"I

branch dispute" could not be settled within the Executive Branch. be-

II

,I

:1'

cause the President had no authority over the special prosecutor with
regard to the issue in question.

Citing several cases which support

a private individual s right to claim the benefit of federal regulations
1

against government imposition, 62 Burger treats them as sufficient to
establish the Attorney General's regulation as giving the special prosecutor adequate protection againstt the President.

The opinion suggests,

then, that the special prosecutor was not within the chain of command
that leads to the President.

Thus, the. prosecutor had the proper au-

thorization to seek assistance from the courts to secure evidence with
respect to trails arising from the presidential election in 1972.

In

passing, Burger deemed it significant, according to a provision in the
regulation, that the Special Prosecutor was not to be removed without
11

the 'consensus' of eight designated leaders of Congress." But the Court
did not consider the possible constitutional separation-of-powers issues
raised by such an arrangement.
In view of these propositions, it is important to point out that
nowhere in the Nixon opinion does the Court deal with the significance
of its previous decisions in such cases as Myers v. United States.6 3

6lsee supra, n. 60, p. 39.
62vitarslli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959); Service v. Dulles, 354
U.S. 363, 388 (1957); Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954).
63 ~]2 U.S. 52 (1926).

"

-41In the Myers case, the Court

stro~gly

asserted the inherent power of

the President to control and remove subordinate policy-level officials
in the Executive Branch despite congressional legislation seeking to
limit it. The Court's decision in United States v. Nixon appears to

I.

1
I
!

implicitly overrule Myers with its holding that Congress may authorize
the Attorney General to establish limitations on the President's power.
Putting this problem in its proper perspective, Alstyne notes:

"If

one insists that the power to provide for trnappointment and removal
of an 'inferior' officer also carries with it the power to provide
for the constitutional finality of an (article II) executive decision
that such person may make, the officer is, to that extent, not an
'inferior' at all--and thus the clause is inoperative. 11 64 According
to Als.jyne, the real issue in United States v. Nixon was, as the
Court put it, whether or not "a President's decision is final in determining what evidence is to be used in a given criminal case. 1165
But he concludes that this issue "was buried and lost, subsumed in the
mere determination of the Special Prosecutor's standing to sue and the
justiciability ~f his claim. 116 6
Having established that the special prosecutor did have standing

~

l
"r.

64Alstyne, op. cit., p. 137.

On this point, Alstyne concludes:
"Only to the extent that the supererogatory authority of the President
of the United States is left free to assert itself'(in any instance
when the President resolves the proper use of article II in some manner contrary to the initial determination of another) can it fairly be
said, that, in respect to that power, the other person is truly an
'inferior' officer;" p. 137.

l

I
l.
~

6594 S. Ct. at 3100.
66Alstyne, op. cit., p. 139.
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-42and that the issue was justiciable, the Court proceeded to deal with
the ultimate issue of "executive privilege." The Court's handling of
the executive privilege question repeats the pattern described above-an ad hoc response to the facts of the case which rises little above
11

ipse dixit. 11

In essence, the Court held that the President has a

privilege, ":fundamental to the operation of government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution, 11 to
p~otect

and maintain confidential communications within the Executive

Branch.

However, that privilege in this case could not "prevail over

the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair

administra~

tion of criminal justice ••• (I)t must yield to the demonstrated,
specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial. 11
There can be little doubt that the Court's reasoning in United
States v. Nixon is good for tnis case only.

We are told that there

is executive privilege, but that the privilege is not absolute; it
will defer at least to the needs of criminal justice. As Professor
Kurland points out, given the reasoning of the Court,

11

it would be

necessary to hold that none of the confidential communications privileges now extant, whether that of husband-wife, lawyer-client, physician-patient, priest-penitant, would protect against a subpoena for
production of such materials. 1167 While the opinion emphasizes that
the process of decision is a balancing process, there are problems in
its language, particularly if, as Kurland suggests, we substitute
any of the other confidential communications privileges for that
which is the subject of the Court's judgment:
67 Kurland, op. cit., p. 73.

i

·I

•'

-43In this case we must weigh the importance of the general privilege of confidentiality of presidential communications in
performance of his responsibilities against the inroads of such
a privilege on the administration of criminal justice. The
interest in preserving confidentiality is weighty indeed and
entitled to great respect. However we cannot conclude that
advisers will be moved to temper the candor of their remarks
by the infrequent occassions of disclosure because of the possibility that such conversations will be called for in the context of a criminal prosecution.
On the other hand, the allowance of the privilege to withbold
evidence that is demonstrably relevant in a criminal trial would
cut deeply into the guarantee of due process of law and gravely
impair the function of the courts. A President's acknowledged
need for confidentiality in the communications of his office
is general in nature, whereas the constitutional need for production of relevant evidenc~ in a criminal proceeding is specific and central to the fair adjudication of justice. Without
access to specific facts a criminal prosecution may be totally
frustrated.

11

'I
J

:i

If we were to accept these propositions, each of the confidential
privileges (husband-wife,etc.) would fall when the contents of the
privil.eged material were so.ught for used in criminal proceedfogs.

Read

in this light, the Court's reasoning in holding against President
Nixon is sparse and at best rests on the grounds of surface plausibility.

In view of the serious implications which the reasoning car-

ries, it seems most unlikely that the narrow holding of United States v.

~

~

Nixon will be applied in the future.

Could there ever be another

Wagergate?

·~
~

Besides these problems in the Court's reasoning, there is also
the problem of the Court assuming that executive privilege is in11

•
11

~

,
ii

'

~I

extricably rooted in the separatd-on of powers under the Constitution."
In the face of strong, if not conclusive, evidence that executive privilege is a 11 myth, 11 Professor Raoul Berger asserts that this assumption
11

legitimate[s] and anoint[s1 presidential claims that are vitiated

by historical facts and which have been perverted by the grossest

'l

I

11
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I

lj

J

j

~

1
I

,,,_______,..J

i'

I

I

-44abuses.

11

68

I ,

Although the Court did hold that this constitutionally-

based privilege must yield to the need for complete evidence in

cri~

minal prosecutions, the impact of the Nixon decision on the Executive
Branch is not inhibiting but life-giving. 69 To cite Professor
11

11

Kurland once again, "(The Court's} holding that article II is the
source of the confidential communication privilege, which the opinion
validates for the first time, may create momentous problems. 117 0

***
In spite of the understandable alarm so recently expressed about
the spiraling growth of executive power, 71 the Court's decisions in
United States v. Nixon, New York Times Co. v. United States, and Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer cannot be read as imposing any serious
limitations on the principle of presidential executive supremacy. To
recall what Justice Jackson in his eloquent Youngstown concurrence said:
11

With all its defects, delays and inconveniences, men have discovered

no technique for long pr.eserving free government except that the
Executive be under the law • • . .

11

But as I have suggested in this

paper, the limits of the law found in each decision is only relevant
to the circumstances surrounding the case.

J
1:
I

Indeed, what seems to emerge

68Raoul Berger, "The Incarnation of Executive Privilege," in Sym
posium: United States v. Nixon, p. 11.
69Karst and Horowitz, op. cit., p. 67.
70Kurland, op. cit., pp. 74-5.
71Rexfo~d G. Tugwell and Thomas E. Cronin (eds.}, The Presidency
(New York: Pra~ger, 1974}; and, Arthur M. Schlesinger,
The mperial Presidency (Boston: H~ughton-Miflin, 1973}.
Reaplrai~ed

I
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-45from the three cases are generalized constitutionally-based executive
powers that are weighed against arguments based on "necessity." In
view of Jackson's statement, the Court also seems to be aware of what
Justice Brandeis said in his dissent in Myers v. United States: Such
powers 11 might conceivably be deemed indispensable to democratic government.11 Thus, the role of the Court has been to walk a ttght line between these two rationales, while an ever-exapnding Presidency continues
to grow.

But the rise of an imperial Presidency certainly does not

rest with the Supreme Court.

As Paul Mishkin notes in his closing

comments on the Nixon case,
The fundamental evil is that the Court was confronted with
the issue. The basic failing was that the problem was not
resolved by the political system, including the other two
branches of government, before it reached the Court. But
the causes of that failure, and possibl, 2cures, must be the
subject of a different, larger inquiry.

'I

,[I
t
I

i

·~

72Mishkin, op. cit., p. 91.
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